With the resurgence of the second wave of COVID-19 in India hitting new heights in terms of the number of cases and fatality, the debate over life v/s livelihood has resurfaced to the fore. Given the benefit of the knowledge of hindsight of the first wave, the recent announcement by PM Narendra Modi to consider Lockdown as the measure of the last resort seems a sensible move given the economic cost it inflicts. However, the question remains, what has gone wrong this time? Why the biggest manufacturer of vaccines around the world reached this point and what needs to be done to curb this problem?
To understand the
rise of coronavirus, we first need to look at the data of the first wave. During
the previous wave, cases started plateauing around the mid of September after
which a decline was seen. Given the fact that as cases started declining in September and started increasing again in March, four
reasons contributed to this disastrous situation. First, complacency and
laxness started resurfacing both in public as well as in government’s behaviour
with a declining number of cases which led to the negligence of COVID-appropriate behaviour. Second,
a false sense of immunity with the start of the vaccination drive in India led to a ‘business
as usual' approach. Third, no renewal of policy measures, while having an advantage of the knowledge of hindsight, to deal with the
change in environment outside led to ambiguity. Fourth, laxness in harnessing the
healthcare facilities and technological innovation, while knowing
imminent danger with the virus, led to pushing India behind the queue of tackling
the challenge in a sustainable way.
A model of steering the price and distribution of vaccine by the central government led to regulation of vaccine dissemination akin to the ‘commanding the controlling heights’ model, a model which has remained close to our hearts. The idea was to make vaccine as cheap as possible to look after consumers, albeit neglecting the interest of producers. When the decentralization and flexible model of the governance structure was most needed to define local solutions to a national problem, an inflexible centralized model was adopted.
While things look hunky-dory at the outset when politicians were chest-thumping themselves in conferring a tag of India as the biggest manufacturer of the vaccine in the world, the ground realities were different. A model of steering the price and distribution of vaccine by the central government led to regulation of vaccine dissemination akin to the ‘controlling the commanding heights’ model, a model which has remained close to our hearts. The idea was to make vaccine as cheap as possible to look after consumers (the general populace), albeit neglecting the interest of producers (vaccine makers). When a decentralised and flexible model of the governance structure was most needed to define local solutions to a national problem, an inflexible centralized model was adopted, as if to define the central government as the master of the fate of every state government and its citizens.
Now the thing comes to how should we go about tackling this problem. Besides adhering to COVID-appropriate behaviour, increasing vaccination drive to include a wider population and looking onto policy issues to implement policies helping life concomitantly with the livelihood of the people, it is equally important to take lessons from the UK, which was also facing the same problem but tackled it, to use scientific measures to understand the SARS CoV-2 virus on a deeper level to make better policy choices. Here the recent moves by the central government to increase vaccination base from age 18 onwards, giving more leeway to states and private firms in vaccine procurement, importing foreign vaccines for dissemination and increasing domestic vaccine production capacity, are some welcoming moves but more needs to be done on the ground level to provide a more flexible policy, uniquely crafted based on geography, demographics and other factors at hand.
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